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Tuesday, 18 Jul 2017

Exclusive – The Tehran Times recently sat for an interview with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) representative in Iran Nazim Dabbagh.

There, we asked Mr. Dabbagh about the current KRG push for a referendum as follows:

Q: Please speak about Jalal Talabani’s recent trip to Tehran and if it had anything to do with the referendum.

A: As you know, there are cordial relations between Mr. Talabani and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Due to his critical health condition, he wasn’t able to visit Iran over the past few years. That was why our friends in Tehran proposed him travel to Iran to get some rest in a special resort after his medical team gave the approval. He was in Iran for a few days and left on Thursday. 

He’s always been interested in optimal political ties between Iran and Iraq, and believes that Iranians and Kurds have had the same geography, race, and religion.

Q: Over the past months, a key issue has been the referendum decision. Why did you come up with that decision?

A: The referendum issue is in line with our Kurdish movement. It began decades ago and has been moving ahead all this time. Our strategies and procedures are time bound. Once it’s a sit-in, protest or fight. Today is the era of diplomatic, parliamentary and popular activities. In spite of a number of Kurds being in the top echelons of the government over the past years, no step has thus far been taken to implement bilateral agreements between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the central government. Nor have Kurds’ constitutional rights been upheld. On top of that, our budget has been cut as well.

As the war with Daesh (Islamic State) broke out, the Kurdish peshmerga was the star of the battlefield both in Syria’s Kobani and Iraq. The Kurdish forces had already been influential in the Fallujah and Al Anbar battlegrounds, and were crucial in keeping Baghdad and those areas under Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution safe and secure. (Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution calls for normalization of areas it refers to as disputed, to be followed by a referendum on whether or not those regions want to be part of the Kurdistan Region. According to the Constitution, the article should have been implemented by the end of 2007, and so far no referendum has been conducted on this issue.) This is while the Iraqi army stopped resisting Daesh fighters and fled the war zone. Had it not been for peshmerga forces, the Iraqi forces would have had to rush to retakeKirkuk after Mosul. Daesh even had plans to attack Erbil and maybe had eyes on Iranian borders.

The point is that throughout this period, the Iraqi government did nothing to help the peshmerga forces. Kurdish lawmakers voted for the formation of Hashd al-Sha'abi (Popular Mobilization Forces) just to regret doing so a while later because the peshmerga law that is part of the Iraq government was not approved by the parliament. The Iraqi government did not provide the Kurdish forces even with the basic tools. 

There are a few agreed-upon projects in the Iraqi parliament, including agreements on oil revenue, peshmerga forces and guidelines for relations between the central Iraqi government and the Kurdish Regional Government. Altogether, these are parts of the so-called Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution.

Interjection: You mean failure to reach agreements on the afore-mentioned issues has brought you to the stage a referendum?

A: Well, these sticking points are not limited just to the ones I cited. As a matter of fact, now that the fight against Daesh has finished, we have our own dialogues. What if the Hashd al-Sha’abi takes power and certain Iraqi authorities decide to pursue the same Baathi policies towards Kurds? The question is how long the Kurds should wait to have their voice heard and their requests granted. That’s why the Kurdish leadership, coupled with the backing of five major groups and other non-major ones, insists on holding the referendum. There are of course differences over the timing of the referendum and optimal conditions for holding it. In fact, no Kurd dares to say he doesn’t want to get independent. The referendum process is a sort of parliamentary, democratic bid to get into the mind of the Kurdish people on the issue. Overall, the referendum decision seeks the attention of the Iraqi government and other actors that the Kurdish government wants in order to achieve its goals via diplomacy and dialogue. 

Of course, in response to the independence move, the Iraqi government may choose to fight us. I have overheard some Iraqi authorities saying “we will fight them (the Kurds). If you go down in history and review the Kurdish past before the Safavid and Ottoman dynasties as well as after the First World War, when […] Mustafa Barzani  [took part in leading] the Kurdish movement, you will notice that they all took to arms and sought independence. But the Kurds’ independence movement has been so far suppressed by internal and external factors. This is an indication that the Kurds have always been seeking to fight for their rights.

This time is no exception. We may enter into confrontation. There are two possibilities. Chances of victory and failure are equal. We can’t be indifferent to our people’s call. Otherwise, it will be treason. In a nutshell, what I am trying to say as the representative of the Kurdish Regional Government is that we believe we should implement the referendum through dialogue with Iran, Turkey, Syria and Iraq and other countries and have their approvals.

We don’t plan to declare independence right on the same day the Kurds vote for the move. Before any declaration movement, some steps need to be taken and we are well aware that Baghdad is the starting point for us to discuss the independence of the Kurdish Regional Government. To do so, we have already agreed on our own negotiation team and the first round of negotiations is likely to take place in the near future.  

A delegation led by Masoud Barzani headed to Brussels for the first time to enlist support for the referendum.

Q: You mentioned that the expectations of the Kurdistan Regional Government from Baghdad on bilateral agreement are yet to be met. And you already referred to some of these “sticking points”. Could you be more specific? 

The role of the Kurds in the new Iraqi government has been strongly highlighted by Ayatollah Sistani who once said Jalal Talabani is the key to the country’s security. Though Mam Jalal is recognized as a prominent political figure in the region who has served as president, we should bear in mind that he is a Kurd. Had it not been for the backing of the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Kurds, it would’ve been impossible for him to play such major role.  
As per our disagreements with Baghdad, what I have said already are just the basic. Differences over oil purchase and sale, peshmerga forces, and Article 140 have to be ironed out. We reached a consensus on oil a few years ago after the invasion of the U.S. when the whole Iraqi political establishment and we cooperated in all stages of drafting the accord. 

The other areas of discord are, as I mentioned before, peshmerga forces and Article 140. The article was passed perhaps because it applies not only to Kurdistan, but to the entire country, Iraq. Major changes were made to Shiite-majority areas such as Najaf, Karbala, Basra, and Al Diwaniyah. Our Shiite friends backed the move in the parliament and approved it, because it was in their interest to do so. They, however, were reluctant to agree with a similar plan in Kurdish-majority areas. Since the passage of the plan in 2008 up to the present, it has been delayed. And these are issues that we disagree on. Unfortunately, the Baathi ideology still dominates parts of the Iraqi decision-making body. Such thinking only accepts itself to the exclusion of others no matter if they are Shiites, Sunnis or Kurds, and consequently that breeds disagreement. For instance, neither Ayad Allawi nor Ibrahim al-Jaafari did anything for the Kurds. We even asked for Jafari to step down simply after two years into a four-year tenure, because his polices fell short of being in compliance with the Iraqi Constitution and of being any good for the country’s unity. 

Again, Nuri al-Maliki completed what his predecessors, opposed to Kurds as he was. Maliki even failed to implement bilateral agreements he himself signed with Masoud Barzani, including 19 articles, and Jalal Talabani. Haider al-Abadi has also made no marked difference for the Kurds. Yet, during his tenure, Iraq’s situation changed as Daesh invaded the country. So, Abadi postponed addressing disagreements between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad until the defeat of Daesh. Finding a solution for the current situation has already been delayed for not being a top priority in an insecure Iraq after the collapse of Saddam or under other circumstances. And this shall continue in the future if left unaddressed. For this reason, the Kurds’ rights should be upheld. I have been with Jalal Talabani since 1964, and throughout it all, we have been seeking to live in harmony and peace one day. Well, the question is this: until when should the Kurds live so? We continue our bid. We may win, we may lose. But God willing, we will make it. Yet, we are fully aware of the geographical position of the Kurdistan Region and we know that any independent Kurdish establishment in Iraq needs to be mindful of the security of its neighboring countries; and

Iraq, of course, is the first country we need to reach a consensus with.

Q: As you argued earlier, different Kurdish groups and parties unanimously agree on the referendum decision. However, there are counterarguments. Change Movement (Goran) and Kurdistan Islamic Group (Komal) have voiced opposition. Also, people familiar with the issue have linked the removal of Ala Talabani as the head of the PUK’s party faction in the Iraqi parliament to her disagreement with the referendum bid. What is your reaction?

A: This is all media hype. First of all, I should say that there is unanimous agreement within the entire political authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government about the referendum decision. The Change Movement and Kurdistan Islamic Group also fully endorse the move but have reservations in terms of the preconditions for holding the referendum. They demand current issues and challenges of the Kurdistan Regional Government be resolved. Also, they argue that the referendum decision should be approved by the parliament not by the government’s leadership. So, they differ on that.

As per Ala Talabani, her removal has nothing to do with the referendum; it is due to some internal issues of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan itself. The removal decision was made by the political bureau of the PUK and has not been applied yet.

Q: Iraq and Turkey have threatened they would resort to force if the Kurdistan Regional Government insists on holding the referendum. What’s your reaction?

A: We have imagined all possibilities. The Kurdish leadership is already battle-hardened. While threats by Iraq and Turkey or any other country can’t be ignored, we have witnessed the worst scenarios over our history. Turkey, for instance, has launched more than 27 strikes against the PKK and Kurds so far.
I need to clarify that wars are not conducive to solutions. Once there were only 3,000 peshmergas. What was the outcome? Saddam Hossein once said two people wouldn’t be allowed to have a sip of water across the Iraqi territory. Due to resistance, one of the two became president of the Kurdistan Regional Government and the other president of Iraq. So, disagreements should not escalate into military confrontation because experience indicates that we are resistant and adamant.

Q: How far do you think it is legitimate for countries with Kurdish communities to voice concern over the referendum decision? 

A: I think it’s their legitimate right to be worried about the referendum move. But, the question arising here is what the root cause of such concerns are. The Kurds are worried about their future, and this should be resolved. 

Interjection: But do you acknowledge that the referendum may set a precedent in the region for other Kurdish communities in neighboring countries? 

A: Yes, this may be the case. But we’re not to blame for that, and it depends on the governments of those countries. Do the Kurds who are fighting Turkey have a government? A second point to bear in mind is that Iraqi Kurds have no right to intervene in other countries. 

Q: What do you say when Iran says it is against the referendum bid in the Kurdistan Region? 

A: Unlike other countries such as Turkey, whose president has threateningly said that the Kurds would regret holding referendum, Iran has merely opposition to the decision while supporting the Kurds in a unified Iraq and urging a return to the Iraqi Constitution. That’s exactly our demand, as well. We want Article 140 of the Constitution to be reactivated and implemented. 

I should reiterate that it’s our neighboring countries’ legitimate right to be worried. But an appropriate solution has to be wrought. We have always highlighted the importance of respecting the security of regional countries, and we need to assure them we are not posing any threats to them. As a matter of fact, we have no other choice but to pursue such policy because we are a landlocked territory, meaning that we commit suicide if we choose to have strained relations with neighboring countries. Just now, trade flow from Iran to the Kurdistan Region is nearly $4 billion, without which it would be difficult for us to continue normal life. So, we’re well aware that if Iran, Turkey, Iraq, or Syria wish, they can suffocate us. 

Q: How do you see the future of the referendum? And what is the way forward? 

A: I’m optimistic, and do believe that any nation or ethnicity who insist on defending thir rights would prevail finally. The referendum shouldn’t be taken to mean declaration of independence. The move is a sort of popular authority bestowed on the Kurdish leadership; that the referendum bid is backed not only by the Kurdish authorities but also the Kurdish people. And when you have such backing, the people are ready to defend and preserve what they have voted for. 

SP/AK

 

http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/415214/Kurdistan-Region-cognizant-of-neighbors-security-concerns

Saturday, 15 Jul 2017

 The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Representative to Tehran, Nazim Dabbagh, told Kurdpress that the visit of Jalal Talabani, the Secretary General of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and former Iraqi President, is not political and blamed those who call the trip political.  

Talabani suffered a heart stroke in 2014 and has been practically out of the politics since then.

He told Kurdpress that since Talabani’s stroke Iranian officials have repeatedly demanded for his travel to Iran for treatment and rest and Talabani himself was very eager to visit the placed he had visited in Iran before and preparation was made for the visit about a month ago so as he could visit Iran for some time.

The representative added that he has accompanied Talabani is most of the meetings Talabani has made and he is very pleased with the situation.

Dabagh added that the Iranian Minister of Health Seyyed Hassan Hashemi met Talabani and stated that the secretary’s general’s health is improving. Hashemi also expressed his hope that Mam Jalal (the way Kurds call Jalal Talabani) would fully regain his health as he has played a significant role in stabilizing the region and the good ties between Iraq and Iran.

 

Link: 

http://www.kurdpress.com/En/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=16460#Title=Jalal Talabani’s visit to Iran is not political, Nazim Dabagh tells Kurdpress

 

 

 

 

 

 

Friday, 07 Jul 2017

 TEHRAN (Tasnim) – The representative of the Iraqi Kurdistan region praised Iran’s role in the Arab country’s recent victories over the Daesh (ISIS or ISIL) terrorist group and said if it had not been for the Islamic Republic’s assistance, Iraq would have fallen to the hands of the terrorists.

Speaking at a forum titled “Iraq after Daesh” held in Tehran on Wednesday, Nazem Dabbagh pointed to the recent recapture of the northern city of Mosul from Daesh terrorists and said the terrorist group has been forced out of Mosul but it is not over yet.

“Daesh is not just a military issue but has become a phenomenon and ideology,” the Iraqi diplomat said.

He further pointed to Tehran’s support for Baghdad in the fight against the terror group, saying that if it had not been for Iran’s assistance, Iraq would have fallen to the hands of Daesh.

Daesh militants made swift advances in northern and western Iraq over the summer of 2014, after capturing swaths of northern Syria.

However, a combination of concentrated attacks by the Iraqi military and the volunteer forces, who rushed to take arms after top Shiite leader Grand Ayatollah Seyed Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa calling for the fight against the militants, blunted the edge of Daesh offensive and forced the terrorist group to withdraw from much of the areas it had occupied.

Iraqi military forces on July 29 captured the Mosul mosque at the heart of the northern city, which Daesh had declared its de facto capital.

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced the liberation of the site of the symbolic al-Nuri Mosque in Old Mosul as “the declaration of the end of the statelet of Daesh.”

Daesh stronghold in Syria’s Raqqa is also close to falling.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wednesday, 28 Sep 2016
In the first part of his interview with AVA Diplomatic, the representative of the Kurdistan Region in Iran not only explained the process of his fights against the Baath regime of Iraq, but he also cleared the air about the formation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Iraq and its role in 8 years of war between Iran and Iraq which you may find below.
 
AVA Diplomatic’s Exclusive Interview with Nazim Omar Dabbagh,
Representative of the Kurdistan Region in Iran
Interview by Mohammadreza Nazari
 
How and why was the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan established?
After the 1975 Algiers Agreement and the huge failure caused for the Kurdish uprising, the order was faced with a malfunction and as a result, the Baath regime boosted pressures and cruelties against the people of Kurdistan. Alongside with the implementation of the agreement, a group of political leaders and officials led by Jalal Talabani established a new organization in Syria on June 1, 1975 named “the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan” and one year after that on June 1, 1976, the armed uprising against the Baath regime initiated. The directing board of the fledgling organization consisted of Mam Jalal, Dr. Kamal Fouad, Dr. Fuad Masum, Nawshirwan Mustafa, Abdul Razaq Feili and Adel Murad, and their objective was to give a new life to the rise and defense of the Kurdish people independently relying solely on the help and support of the Kurds.
Why was this union formed basically?
The truth is they were after continuing the battle and defending the Kurdish people and standing up against the fascist Baath regime of Iraq.
Did power fall into the hands of Saddam Husain after the Baath coup in Iraq?
In my opinion, although Saddam Hussein succeeded the then President, Ahmed Hassan el-Bakr since the very beginning, he was powerful and a man of vast potentials in politics.
When did you join the Union?
I made links with the Patriotic Union since it was first established. My connection with the freedom movement of the Kurdish people, however, started in September, 1961 as a proponent and a member of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. Later on in 1964 when the talks began with Abdul Salam Arif under the Barzani leadership and after the coup that targeted Abd al-Karim Qasim, the party divided into two thought wings which included the pro-Barzanis and the proponents of the political office. We were part of the students union who supported the political office and belonged to Jalal Talabani’s side and that went on up to when the Patriotic Union was established. Soon as the September Uprising began in March, 1974, I joined them and the Peshmerga forces. After that, I went to Iran and found asylum at a refugee camp.
What were you doing back then?
After finishing high school in 1966, I entered the teachers institute center and graduated in spring of 1970. In October, 1970, I became a teacher in the Barzan and Mirga-Sur regions, and since September, 1961, I was constantly active in student and party gatherings. In 1974, I joined the Peshmerga forces and later, taught in the Qulti and Rabt camps in Sardasht. I returned to Kurdistan in Iraq after the Algiers agreement.
Did you cooperate with the Marxist, Leninist Komalah Party of the Iraqi Kurdistan?
Not directly. Before the formation of Komalah in 1970, there was an elite group which we participated in. In the early days of 1970, we used to be raising our awareness by studying Mao Zedong, Marx and Lenin. We used to go to the Chinese embassy in Baghdad and when we introduced ourselves on behalf of Jalal Talabani, they lent us books and papers.
Had the Marxist mindset already left an impact on the armed activities of Kurds?
Mam Jalal had a Maoist thinking style, and ideologically, that was more compatible with the Kurdish status. The Maoism movement geared toward farmers, not labors. The Kurdish society was based on agriculture, too, not labor.
When did you first meet Mr. Talabani?
The first time goes back to the time after the coup of Abdul Salam Arif against Abd al-Karim Qasem in 1964, when Mam Jalal, as a commander of Peshmerga forces who resided close to Koy Sanjaq, took the road to the Faqih Khedr-Kanileh Cemetery and entered the city. We, as the youth and students, followed them. He was being accompanied by 25 Peshmerga soldiers; they entered Mahmoud Aqa Mosque which was located downtown, gave a speech and we listened. That was the first time I was seeing Jalal Talabani from that close an angle and the picture of that day is enclosed in the first chapter of Mam Jalal’s diary book.
Did you gear toward him that day?
In the early breaths of the September uprising in 1961, Mam Jalal had bases around the city of Koy Sanjaq in the Razan River and Haji Qal’e region under his command as a Peshmerga commander of Kurdistan. His name was repeated regularly among people and we, too, as the youth of Koy Sanjaq felt proud of it and were influenced by his thoughts; a path we have continued to follow up to now. Back then, we work in the party’s bureau.
Where were you when the Algiers agreement was signed?
As I said earlier, back then, I was a teacher and lived with part of my family in the camp of Rabt.
How did you become a member of the leading board of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in 1980?
Since April 8 to August 17, 1979, I was in jail by the official decree of Saddam Husain and when I was released, I received a letter from the party and Mam Jalal to attend extensive meetings of the Patriotic Union in the mountains which aimed at reinvigorating the organizations of the socialistic movement of Kurdistan there which Kak Rasoul Momand and others sought separation from and a majority of them left. Another crowd including Dr. Khaled Saeed, Ali Askari and Hussein Baba Sheikh Yazidi were martyred or dispersed by the temporary army during the Hakari tragedy where they were tagged along by some 600 Peshmerga soldiers.
On January 2, 1980, I arrived in Nawzang where the political and private offices of Mam Jalal were located. I had made up my mind not to return and to stay with the Peshmerga forces. The reason was that I had just been released from Saddam’s imprisonment and if I had been caught once again, our execution would have been categorical. Mam Jalal became very happy about my decision and welcomed it.
What happened after that?
In March 1980, the union session was held and I was elected as a member of the leading board of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Central Association and the Leading Council of the Socialistic Movement. Later on, from June, 1980 until the first congress in 1991 after the uprising in Sulaymaniyah, I was a member of the political office and in charge of the ministerial and financial sector. Then, I did not nominate for any leading position and in 1991, I was the administrative director of the political office and after that, served for three years as the deputy minister of education. After what happened on August 31, I sought asylum in the Netherlands and was later appointed representative of the Patriotic Union and Mam Jalal in the sector for organizing and the affairs related to the national Kurd congress in Brussels until when the Washington Agreement was inked between the Union and the Party, I took a path though Iran and returned to Kurdistan at Mam Jalal’s behest. Mam Jalal was in Tehran back then and wanted for me to be his special representative in Iran and so, I am officially in Iran since September 18, 1999.
You were active in Dahuk in the process of liberating Kurdistan in 1991. Tell us more about your mission.
This goes back to an agenda and operation set by the leadership of the union and the Kurdish front at that time.
Kurdistan had been categorized into four main parts; provincially, the governor general, Kak Nawshirwan Mustafa, governor of Erbil, Kak Kosrat Rasoul, governor of Sulaymaniyah, Kak Omar Abdullah, governor of Kirkuk, Fereydoun Abdulghader and me, as the governor of Dahuk. Of course, we were all union forces, but for each governorate, a committee was formed which included all Kurdish Front forces. We summoned all Peshmerga officials of each region and coordinated ourselves with the forces inside the cities and the Peshmerga forces all through the axis of Dahuk, Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk and Erbil. As a Patriotic union force, I, too, moved to the governorate of Dahuk on March 10, 1991 and arrived in Aqrah on March 13, 1991. After the liberation on March 14, 1991, we entered the liberated city of Dahuk which was the fruit of the people’s uprising and the organization and the liberty flag was raised in the city.
Did the liberation of Dahuk come with bloodshed and conflicts?
The liberation definitely came at the cost of martyrdom and losses. The pro-regime forces who resisted were killed and the proportion of martyrs and the injured was small compared to the victory and liberating the city. Many Iraqi officers and soldiers gave up or were held captive who we later released, and that was what we prided on; not only didn’t we kill any captives, but we also freed them which was an addition to the public remission issued earlier.
The liberation of the Kurdistan Region coincided with Saddam Hussein’s assault against Kuwait.
The liberation of Kurdistan happened after the attacks of the Allies against Kuwait and expelling the Iraqi Army from the country. I would like to make a reference to historical moment. In July, 1990, I was in Paris with Mam Jalal and attended most of his meetings with French officials such as Bernard Kushner, Ms. Mitterrand and other FM figures. There were talks about the state of Iraq and the region and Mam Jalal said, “In my opinion, after the war comes to a halt, Saddam Hussein has plans to launch assaults against the Gulf States, including Kuwait,” and in response, the French officials at the Foreign Ministry stated, “This is simply a dream, Mam Jalal. How will Saddam ever do this?” Mam Jalal replied, “It is logically impossible, I agree. But considering our familiarity and information we have with and of Saddam’s thinking style, he will do it!”
Well, on August 2, 1990, Saddam attacked Kuwait and the Guardian and Lomond wrote the first to anticipate this was Jalal Talabani. However, I think during a speech in London on July 11, 1990, Mam Jalal had offered his prediction, too. After the invasion of Kuwait, the French FM officials sent a message to Mam Jalal through the Union’s representative in Paris, who was then Ahmad Bamerni. I went there and they asked if Mam Jalal knew what would take place after the invasion of Kuwait. On August 5, 1990, I returned to Syria through Damascus and met Mam Jalal to deliver to message. He said to me, “You should’ve told them they can wait for me to have another dream; maybe then I would tell!” Mam Jalal’s prediction, of course, was that the invasion of Kuwait would not be tolerated for long, as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were redlines and the Iraqi Army would be sent out and taken action against. A letter was sent to the political bureau and Kak Nawshirwan from me saying, “At the time of assaulting and liberating Kuwait, the Iraqi Army would face a great defeat. Therefore it is of the essence that the Kurdish front be alarmed, be prepared to rise and deploy armed troops inside cities and Peshmerga fighters around them to be at the ready for whatever that could possible come their way.” After Mam Jalal’s letter was delivered, the political bureau convened a session under Kak Nawshirwan and plans for forming armed groups and Peshmerga forces along with setting agendas in coordination with the Kurdish front to rise and liberate Kurdistan were prepared in which all parties of the Union, socialists, democrats, communists, etc. would take part.
Based on what reasoning did Saddam Hussein attack Kuwait?
Saddam Hussein was after taking reprisals. Iraqis claim Kuwait had once been part of Iraq and was then separated; they were not happy with Kuwait’s cooperation with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, either.
What was the operational plans of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to control the circumstances after Saddam Hussein was weakened?
Mam Jalal believed we had to prepare ourselves to launch the public uprising through the Kurdish front and liberate the regions of Kurdistan when the Allies attack and defeat the Iraqi Army. According to the response to his letter, forces and officials divided into the four governorates of Kirkuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk. The union forces that had been in Iran were called on and given the mission objectives.
Did you have military camps or garrisons in Iran?
No, we did not.
But you just said some of these forces came from Iran.
I was referring to the camps of people in Iran which included refugees from villages or families of the Peshmerga forces who had been forced into displacement, like my own family that lived in Mahabad. We took these people close to borders and dispatched them at our office which was located on the Iraqi soil. But all of the PDK forces were in Iran. It should be mentioned, of course, that Iran made substantial logistic, arm and health contributions to the Kurdish people.
Did Iran provide the Peshmerga forces with weaponry?
Iran helped the Kurds in every way. Iran provided whatever the Kurds asked for. It was not like Kurds had bases in the Iraqi Kurdistan, but the forces came to Iran to rest and recover. All of our garrisons were inside Iraq and forces were allowed to come to Iran only when dismissed temporarily or having families in the country. They could also travel to Iran to cure themselves if they had been injured or sick. Even once I was injured in 1980, came to Iran for treatment and stayed at Pars Hotel on Nejatollahi St. in Tehran. Back then, the Islamic Revolution had just come to fruition and ideological disagreements were intense. At that time, each school of thought had some voice it on the street and another would respond to it, and whoever could reason more strongly would gain more popularity, and afterwards, there were demonstrations and protests out there.
Would you please elaborate on how the Peshmerga and Kurdish forces aided Iranian forces during the Iran-Iraq war?
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Iraq participated in the operations Valfajr 1, 2, 3, Fath-el-Mobin 1, 2, 3 and 4 during the Iran-Iraq war. I was once the coordinating director for supplying ammo and logistics from the Kurdish forces during the Fath-el-Mobin operation. At the time, I had offices both in the Iranian village of Kani Zard which is close to the Iraqi border and in the Dulah Kuke which is now in the hands of PJAK. I was in charge of receiving logistic contributions from the I. R. Iran which were delivered in Sardasht, Naqadeh and Kermanshah. Then, Gen. Mohammad Bagher Zolqadr was the chief commander of the Ramazan Headquarter and Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani, the chief commander of the Khatam-al-Anbia Headquarter. I went to Mr. Rafsanjani’s office a few times and met with his chief of staff, Mr. Ali Agha Mohammadi. Let me tell you a memory of Mr. Agha Mohamadi. I think it was 1994 when he made a trip to the Kurdistan Region and it was neither time nor the season to rain. But soon as he set foot in the Region, it strangely began to rain and that is why people nicknamed him “Ayatollah Matari” (Ayatollah of the Rain).
Why did you decide to take refuge to the Netherlands?
After what happened on August 31, 1996 and parts of the Kurdish lands fell into the hands of the Baath allies, I stayed in the Kurdistan Region and in cooperation with Iran, we managed to win some of them back. Once again I was the coordinating director between Iran and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Naqadeh in Iran in order to keep military and logistic cooperation going. My mission came to an end once they told us that in spite of how farther we could advance and take back all parts of the Iraqi Kurdistan, the liberation operations had gone enough. When August 31 occurred, I resided in Erbil and announced, “I do not intend to occupy the house of a member of another party in Sulaymaniah just like my own house that has been occupied by another party in Erbil!” I used to live in Paris then, but did not go there, for my family had to be with me. Even when I was in the village, one room was allocated to my child and wife and another was my office.
When those things happened, I told Mr. Talabani that my family and I would leave the Iraqi Kurdistan and he agreed. To do so, I went to the Netherlands and registered myself as a refugee. In fact, whenever a war breaks out, many deviations happen; if that statement weren’t true, then Mr. Barzani would not become allies with Saddam to attack us. After entering the Netherlands, I said, “I would stop armed battles, come to your country, and if you allow me, I would continue my political activities and whenever everything subsided in my own country, I’d go back and proceed there.”
After two weeks, my refuge application was processed in the Netherlands, and even though I wanted to return to Iraq, Mr. Talabani designated me as a member of the Representative Committee of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Europe which was headed by the current President of Iraq, Dr. Fuad Masum. After that, Mr. Talabani appointed me his special representative in Brussels for National and Kurdish activities until the Washington agreement came to exist between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the PDK.
When I moved back to Tehran, Mr. Talabani was there, too and we both stayed at Esteghlal Hotel. He told me, “I have an offer for you. Would you like to be my special representative in Iran?” I said, “As you please,” and ever since I have been Mr. Talabani’s special representative in Iran. After 2003, I officially became the representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and as of 2007, I am serving as the representative of the government of the Kurdistan Region in Iran.
Sunday, 01 May 2016

Somayyeh Khomarbaghi, the reporter of Mehr News Agency, in talk with Nazem Dabbagh the representative of Kurdistan Regional Government in Iran relating to the elections of the presidency of Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the discussion of federalism in Iraq asked some questions of which the most important responses of Mr. Dabbagh followed:

 

In a response to the first question real to the presidency of Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Mr. Dabbagh said: as of a yet it has not arrived at a conclusion, and it is obvious that it is a complicate concern. This requires an agreement, and now that the war ISIS and economic crisis and lack of political stability in Iraq affect the problems to be treated, it seems to be difficult. Concerning with the relations between Democrat party of Kurdistan and Iran, the representative of Kurdistan Region in Iran said: in general the relations between Iran and Democrat Party of Iraqi Kurdistan is completely normal and ongoing and if opinions exchange needed, this will happen through special communication channels. He continued: if according the constitution of Iraq they do not recognize other rights officially, Iraq absolutely will be led to an unobvious future and rapture. In these current conditions it is felt that there are some who are trying to interrupt the lines of nation and political forces. He mentioned the role of federalism to keep Iraq united and believed: federalism is the cause of Iraq unity.

Sunday, 17 Apr 2016

 According to Mehr News Agency, Nazem Dabbagh the representative of Kurdistan Regional Government, conversing with Avineh Press posed important points around the relations between Iran and Region as followed:

 

The reporter of Avineh Press pointing Mr. Dabbagh‘s recent visit with Barezani asked him about what message he was bearing for Kurdsitan Region from Iran, not directly indicating the content of the message he replied: that Region representative visited the president of the Region in Tehran was enough to be a message. Stating the positions of Iran concerning the insist on Kurdish parties’ unity and interrelation of Iran and the Region’s security, in the response to another question relating Kurdistan Region presidency said: Iran has insisted on that this is a domestic concern, while has on the consolidation of Iraq and Iraq Federal Law officially recognizing Kurds’ rights.

Dabbagh denied any relations and supports of Iran from Islamic Society of Kurdistan Region of Iraq and P.K.K and knew it untrue. He made it clear: unfortunately the concern is us ourselves, who aren't able to get united and extend it to other countries. About the matter of Kurdistan Region presidency he stated: Iran is neither of sides, in all meetings Iran insisted on the unity among Kurds. He went on: Iran, at the highest political levels, already tried to intercede with Kurds. He Said: General Soleimani’s trip to Kurdistan has taken for this.

In a response to a question relating reduction of Iran and Kurdistan Democrat Party’s relations levels Dabbagh said: let me state more clearly that Kurdistan Democratic Party has not distanced from Iran, so that would want to approach again. As far as I know it has a good relation with Iran.

The reporter asked Dabbagh about Iran’s position concerning Kurdistan Region’s tendency toward Sunni Block of the region and he answered: I am sure that Iran likes the Region to remain as the same as Federal Region in the frame of Iraq and likes the region to be the president of Iraq. This itself proves that Iran is not interested in that the Region tends to other directs in region. He kept on: Kurds should be much aware no to be digested in Sunni policy of region, it is obvious that if so, Iran will not react well. In the response to the last question around Kurdistan Region and Iran’s relations in the field of oil, Dabbagh said: Iran has already stated to support oil and gas relations of Kurdistan Region and prepared to export oil through Persian Gulf to the world, presently there is a delegation of Energy Ministry of the Region in Tehran to make this more practical.

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